After the Supreme Leader, After Fordo
Any viable political force hoping to step in must already have a domestic base, an organizational structure, and some measure of security and military support to prevent the collapse into anarchy. No such force exists.
Day 7 - June 19, 2025
From the perspective of U.S. strategic planning, there are two potential events that would mark the irreversible collapse of diplomacy with Iran, moments so definitive that any return to the negotiating table would become either impossible or meaningless. Each, on its own, constitutes a point of no return. The first is the assassination of the Supreme Leader. The second, the destruction of the Fordo nuclear facility.
The death of the Supreme Leader would mean the disappearance of a negotiating counterpart—no longer would there be a singular, authoritative voice capable of representing Iran in a nuclear deal. At that point, the diplomatic process would effectively dissolve into irrelevance.
The destruction of Fordo would produce the same result. A direct American military strike, in coordination with Israel, using fifteen-thousand-pound bombs to annihilate Iran’s most fortified nuclear site—for the first time in history—would close the door on diplomacy for good. It would mark the official entry of the United States into Israel’s offensive war against Iran.
Until one of these two scenarios becomes reality, the White House may still calculate that a weakened, cornered Islamic Republic is the less costly outcome—especially when weighed against the chaos of full-scale war. That calculation also entails keeping Netanyahu’s war cabinet on a short leash. At the moment of this writing, the final decision in Washington has not yet been made.
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If the U.S. and Israel cross that point of no return, the conflict will enter a new phase: the full dismantling of Iran’s political and military apparatus. And from there, all bets are off. Nothing can be cleanly planned or confidently predicted.
Any viable political force hoping to step in must already have a domestic base, an organizational structure, and some measure of security and military support to prevent the collapse into anarchy. No such force exists.
Reza Pahlavi, for instance, would need the full backing of the Mossad and the U.S. military to return and establish a government—but short of an Iraq-style military occupation, he has no realistic pathway. And even then, foreign forces tasked with protecting him would be exposed to immense risk. Reza is no Golani commander with a thirty-thousand-man army, no Ahmad Chalabi flanked by American boots on the ground, and certainly no Mossadegh or Khomeini figure capable of rallying a million people to the streets.
If he sets foot in Iran, he will be swiftly devoured—especially by remnants of the IRGC, Basij, or even the Mojahedin-e Khalq. The rest of the right-wing opposition amounts to media influencers with no real strategic depth or capable cadres behind them.
A “coup” by the IRGC would simply be the Islamic Republic reborn in a more brutal form. If these military actors seize power, they will not willingly hand over their privileges to any rival faction.
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In short, the United States is not in a position to carry out regime change in Iran in the style of Iraq or Afghanistan. The more likely outcome of an Israeli-led overthrow is collapse, political and territorial. Partition is no longer a taboo concept: the editorial board of the Jerusalem Post has already floated this idea to Netanyahu, suggesting the separation of Kurdistan and Baluchistan as potential solutions.
In such a scenario, figures like Abdullah Mohtadi and Masoud Barzani would become central players. Reza Pahlavi might, at best, secure a minor role in a regional Kurdish administration—assuming the right-wing Kurds even choose to let him in the game.
The rest of Iran would descend into deadly clashes between remnants of the Islamic Republic, the Mojahedin, ethnic minority militias, and other rival factions. From a U.S. strategic standpoint, this is the chaos Donald Trump must now weigh: does plunging the American military into such an inferno—right next to the Gulf’s oil reserves—offer real strategic value? Or is striking a deal with the “little devil” still the more rational choice?
/// A.K.
